tial maxima. We also offer a formal definition that distinguishes weak power networks from other network types.
The extension of NET to weak power phenomena results from theory competition. Yamagishi and Cook (1990) observed that early versions of NET did not predict certain power differentials produced by their computer simulations. We show that those power differentials arise from structural properties that were not addressed in any previous theory. We develop and empirically test an extension of NET that identifies the general class of networks and the specific relations in which weak power emerges, and the direction and strength of the weak power effect.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In NET, a relation is an exchange opportunity between a pair of individual or corporate decision-making actors, and an actor's position contains the actor and is designated by its pattern of relations to other actors. A network is a set of positions and relations that forms a unitary structure.
Although it functions as a self-contained theory, NET developed within a much broader theoretical research program. This program, "elementary theory," addresses basic social forms including coercive, conflictual, and exchange relations (Willer and Anderson 1981; Willer 1987 ; Willer and Markovsky forthcoming).' Within the exchange relations branch of the elementary theory are subbranches for exclusionary, inclusionary, and mixed exchange networks. These designations indicate types of restrictions on actors' efforts to obtain resources in exchange networks. In an exclusionary network, actors with two or more relations cannot exchange in one or more of their relations. In an inclusionary network, actors must exchange in more than one relation. In a mixed network, actors can exchange only in some relations and must exchange in more than one relation.2 We focus here on the exclusionary exchange networks branch of the broader theory.
NET's seven scope conditions delimit the situations to which the theory may be applied:
(1) all actors use identical strategies in negotiating exchanges; (2) actors consistently excluded from exchanges raise their offers; (3) those consistently included in exchanges lower their offers; (4) actors accept the best offer they receive, and choose randomly in deciding among tied best offers; (5) each position is related to, and seeks exchange with, one or more other positions; (6) at the start of an exchange round, equal pools of positively valued resource units are available in every relation; (7) two positions receive resources from their common pool if and only if they exchange. The theory specifies that position i has structural power over position j when i can, without cost, exclude] from exchanging. This induces j to accept lower payoffs. By this reasoning, odd-length paths benefit their position of origin by enhancing its capacity to exclude (Markovsky et al. 1988 ). Even-length paths are detrimental because they increase the chance of being excluded. Thus, to calculate GPI, add the number of a position's odd-length paths and subtract the number of even-length paths. These initial GPI values for each position in each network appear at the bottom of Table 1 Because we are dealing here with networks in which e = 1, the terms "network" and "domain" are coterminous, and we use "network" throughout. In general, however, our assertions about networks are more accurately viewed as assertions about domains.
In previous experiments, hypotheses derived from these axioms accurately predicted relative exchange profits for different positions, network decompositions at certain relations, and power reversals induced by changes in e (Markovsky et al. 1988 ). The research also refuted alternative hypotheses from power-dependence theory (Cook et al. 1983; Cook et al. 1986 ).
NEW THEORETICAL CONCERNS
Other researchers have questioned the ability of the GPI to predict power levels in stem and kite networks. Yamagishi and Cook (1990) , using a computer simulation, claimed that positions A and D have high power, in contrast to GPI predictions of equal power in all stem and kite relations after Axiom 2 is applied.5 However, their simulation's profit differentials were very small (equality ? 2) relative to empirical studies and other simulations they described (Cook et al. 1983 ). Furthermore, they did not publish the simulation algorithm, show how to derive their predictions, or present any empirical evidence. Stolte (1990) provided a formal model, but noted that it "does not perform well in predicting positional power, as conditioned by remote structural influences" (p. 141). Hence, although both studies recognized that power differences can exist in these structures, they did not offer a testable theory for predicting specific power differences or identifying the class of structures in which these power differences should occur.
Markovsky, Willer, and Patton (1990) agreed that GPI predicted no power differences among actors in the kite and stem networks, but pointed out that although Yamagishi and Cook's intuitions could be correct, the lack of an alternative model and empirical evidence weakened their argument. We have since replicated Yamagishi and Cook's simulations for the kite and stem networks and explored many other networks. Our goal was to provide an explicit, general method for predicting the emergence of this weak power effect coupled with empirical evidence.6
During our research we made several discoveries. (1) Weak power differentials are sensitive to the particular strategies adopted and behaviors enacted by actors in particular network positions. (2) Weak power differentials have the same microfoundation as strong power differentials: Actors seeking to avoid exclusion from exchanges accept deals favorable to others and unfavorable to themselves. (3) Weak power is produced by a subtle interaction between network structures and exchange conditions. (4) Although the networks in which weak power emerges had already been identified (Markovsky et al. 1988 ), a refinement was needed to locate the specific weak power relations within those networks.
GPI3: AN ITERATIVE REFINEMENT
Our extension of network exchange theory builds on GPI2 to generate refined predictions of weak power. Under GPI2, ongoing exchanges can produce temporary changes in the number of an actor's available exchange partners, the number of the partners' partners, and so on (Markovsky et al. 1988 , p. 225n). Thus, the extension, GPI3, must take into account temporary power shifts that arise as some actors exchange in a given time period and leave behind altered substructures. The stem and kite networks illustrate these problems, but our solution generalizes to all weak power networks.
5 Stolte (1990) asserted that A has an advantage and presented experimental evidence for this claim. However, his experiment violates our scope conditions because subjects' exchange outcomes had no bearing on their actual payments (Stolte 1988 ). The relevance of his results to NET therefore remains undetermined. 6 We employed a user-friendly simulation program for exchange networks, X-Net, which is available on request from the first author. The researcher can create or select any network configuration and choose the number of "experiments" and negotiation "rounds," resource pool sizes, exchanges per round, and actors' decision strategies. Unless otherwise specified, an actor decreases all offers in the next round by one unit if the actor makes all the exchanges it seeks in a given round. If the actor makes fewer deals than were sought, then the actor (I) decreases its offers by one unit to those with whom a deal was completed, and (2) increases offers by one unit to those with whom a deal was not completed. In a given round, an actor can seek exchange only from a number of others equal to the maximum number of exchanges it can complete in the round. In the current version of X-Net, three partner-choice strategies are available: (1) actor randomly seeks exchange with any partner whose offer is "complementary," e.g., actor offers 14,
The new procedure analyzes exchangeseeks. In the original formulation, an actor i was said to be seeking exchange when his, her, or its offers to another, j, are competitive with j's alternative offers.7 Exchange-seek analysis is a tool that generates predictions of a network structure's effect on exchange outcomes. Whether applied to human, corporate, or simulated networks, the theory's exchange-seek axioms need not correspond to actual events. However, the axioms are not arbitrary -they were designed to generate derivations and hypotheses for exchange outcomes that are more precise and accurate than alternatives. As with any formal theory, its derived hypotheses must be empirically informative -not necessarily its axioms (Jasso 1988 ). In the case of NET, derived hypotheses predict (1) when actors in empirical tests will not seek exchange and, thus, where the network breaks from disuse, and (2) the relative exchange outcomes at different positions. Even when positions in a network have the same GPI2, as in the stem and kite networks, they may still be differentiated by a structural property weaker than that producing strong power. The reasoning is this: An actor in a position with two or more equal power relations initially has no preference among the alternatives. As negotiations proceed, however, one or more of the alternatives may have already exchanged and thus become unavailable. In the stem network, for example, if A and B exchange first in a given round, the C's are not excluded and can exchange with each other. If A and Cl other offers its complement, 10; (2) actors randomly seek exchange after compromising with others using a "split-the-difference" rule; (3) actors seek exchange from those making the most profitable offers after compromising. The modular program design also facilitates exploration of other strategies via programming changes. 7 For example, if i offers 5 units to j, and j's best alternative offer is 10, then i's offer is not competitive with the alternative. From the standpoint of our analytic method, i is not seeking exchange with j in this case. This definition of exchange-seeking (and nonseeking) enables us to predict which network relations will be used. The definition embodies no implicit assumptions about actors' motives, interpretations, strategies, etc. 8 The procedure yields identical predictions if the isolate is assigned a GPI2 of 0, but doing so results in additional steps. We have not yet fully explored the implications of assigning I versus 0 to isolates. More than one iteration of the exchange-seek analysis may be required in more complex networks. In complex networks, the analysis is complete when index values remain unchanged. Only strong power structures exhibit a "ratcheting" process whereby actors in structurally disadvantaged positions serially outbid one another through ever-increasing offers to the advantaged. (3) As a result of such bidding wars among the structurally disadvantaged, even passive bargaining stances result in extreme profit advantages for actors in structurally advantaged positions in strong power networks. In weak power networks, obtaining more than minimal profit advantages requires more active strategizing by the structurally advantaged. (4) Consequently, in weak power networks structural forces keep exchanges relatively close to equal profit divisions. Conversely, in strong power networks structural forces move outcomes toward maximum differentiation. (5) A fundamental difference is that strong power structures guarantee that one or more actors will be excluded by another actor who is never excluded. Weak power structures ensure that either all positions are prone to exclusion (as in the kite), or that no position -not even a position that of structural necessity is never excluded (e.g., A in the stem) -is assured of being able to exclude another without cost. Thus, the certainty of exclusions in strong power networks is replaced by the possibility of exclusions in weak power networks.
To make more refined predictions, we must turn this "possibility" of exclusion into a probability measure that applies when structurally dissimilar network positions have the same GPI2 values. To perform the weak power analysis, we calculate each position's likelihood of inclusion under a "random exchangeseek" assumption. The resulting probability measure is GPI3. The easiest way to grasp this measure is with the tree diagram for the stem network shown in Figure 4 . Branches correspond to events (e.g., exchange-seeks) that are assigned probabilities. A series of connected branches represents a combination of events whose overall probability is the product of the values assigned to its constituent branches. The probability of a particular outcome, e.g., a mutual A-C1 exchange-seek, is the sum of all of the probabilities associated with branch combinations leading to that outcome. The GPI3 value for a position, then, is the sum of the probabilities across its relations.9
In Figure If mutual exchange-seeks promote exchanges, then these probability values differentiate positions according to a structurally-based likelihood of inclusion in exchange. These probabilities can then be used to generate hypotheses for exchange outcomes.
Individual Forces
Although our goal is to improve GPI2's ability to predict exchange outcomes based on network structures, under certain conditions actors can systematically alter structurally-induced exchange outcomes. Our approach is to (1) treat structural-level factors as setting a baseline for exchange outcomes as detailed above, (2) consider how individual-level behaviors can modify outcomes relative to that baseline, and (3) conduct tests that manipulate a particular individual-level condition expected to affect such behaviors.
The two most important decisions that actors in our networks make are (1) with whom to exchange and (2) whether and how to adjust offers contingent on prior or anticipated outcomes. In our computer simulations of weak power structures, unconditional (i.e., random) offer-adjustment strategies consistently pro-9 This probability analysis extracts information on a particular structural property -it does not predict actual behaviors. We have two different computer programs that calculate these probabilities, both available from the authors on request: WPOWER calculates exact probabilities, WEAK-NET estimates probabilities by simulating thousands of rounds of random exchange-seeks and exchanges. WEAKNET estimates converge on WPOWER calculations. duce small but systematic outcome differentials. For example, when simulated actors in the stem network adjust their offers randomly by -1, 0, or +1 following exchange or exclusion, A still has a consistent advantage over B of one or two points above equal profit levels. With conditional adjustment strategies (e.g., "add one to last offer following exclusion; subtract one following inclusion"), varying partner-choice strategies result in varying advantages for A. Some strategies give A larger advantages, but never as great as those in strong power structures. In general, most strategies either sustain minimal weak power differentials or enhance them to levels still well below those for strong power. Furthermore, although certain combinations of strategies affect outcomes in strong power structures (Markovsky 1987 ), strong power is clearly more robust than weak power.
These simulations have direct implications for empirical research. In network exchange experiments, subjects are instructed to try to maximize profit. Few hesitate to do so. However, when subjects must conduct simultaneous negotiations in multiple relations, optimal strategies may not be obvious. In such cases, subjects' strategies should improve with experience. The research reported below examines whether experienced subjects discover more potent strategies. Further, based on the simulation results, those more potent strategies should favor subjects in advantaged positions over subjects in disadvantaged positions, and so amplify the weak power effect.'0
METHOD AND HYPOTHESES
Subjects were undergraduates at a large university who agreed to participate in the research in return for pay. After arriving at the laboratory, each subject received general information about the research. Instructions noted that the experiment investigates the effect of social structures on negotiation. Subjects were told the size of the resource pools to be divided (24 units) as well as the monetary value of each point (5 cents).
Subjects interacted via interconnected microcomputers located in separate rooms. The exchange network configuration was displayed on subjects' screens, along with full information on current offers and completed exchanges. Prior to the experiment, assistants showed subjects how to interpret information on their computer screens and how to use the keyboard to make and accept offers. This training period ended with a practice session in which subjects "negotiated" with simulated others. The practice session was realistic in that subjects made and received offers as they would in the experiment; but practice was unrealistic with respect to the others' offers and their likelihoods of accepting the subjects' offers. The practice network also differed from the networks actually tested in the study.
Experiments were organized by rounds, periods and sessions. Each session involved a different set of subjects -eight sets of four subjects each for the stem network and six sets of five subjects each for the kite network. Subjects were rotated to new positions between periods by a software reconfiguration, and each subject eventually occupied every position. This allowed us to distinguish network effects from idiosyncratic subject-pair effects." I Each period contained four negotiation rounds of up to five minutes each. At the end of each round, subjects were informed of their earnings in that 10 Technically speaking, our computer simulations embody auxiliary assumptions (vis-h-vis NET's axioms) regarding actors' decision strategies, and the outcomes of those simulations provide derivations that predict long-run exchange outcomes and frequencies. Translating those derivations into operational terms yields the individuallevel hypotheses that we test empirically. I I One reviewer suggested that owing to the relatively small number of rounds per period, the effects of exclusion may be attributable to subjects' perceptions of its likelihood rather than to its incidence. This could be the case, but GPI3 predicts exchange outcome ranks, not empirical exclusion rates. GPI3 correctly predicts exclusion rates in WEAKNET simulations and so, with refinements, could serve as the basis for a model of actual rates. Moreover, actual inclusion rates were in fact closest to GPI3 values for inexperienced subjects who, presumably, would be more likely than experienced subjects to learn by being excluded. Although rotating subjects between periods may have prevented them from developing regular patterns of exchange with their partners, as they would in natural settings, our purpose was to test the weak power formulation, not to reproduce any particular "natural setting" in the laboratory. Webster and Kervin (1971) provided a cogent rationale for the use of artificiality in social scientific experiments.
round. At the end of the session subjects were paid based on the points they earned. The average was $10.
All subjects received the same training, but subjects differed in their previous experience with network exchange experiments. For the stem network, four groups contained subjects who had prior experience in experiments on another network structure, while the other four groups were composed of inexperienced subjects. For the kite network, four groups were experienced and two were inexperienced.
Structural Effects
The probability analyses permit us to state critical hypotheses for exchange outcomes in experimental stem and kite networks. Hypotheses pertain to mean resource units obtained per exchange, and are derived by relating theoretical inclusion probability ranks to exchange outcome ranks. 
Individual Effects
Strategic behavior tends to enhance weak power differentials, as observed in computer simulations. Assuming that experienced subjects use more effective strategies than inexperienced subjects:
H3: Resource differentials predicted in HI and H2 will be greater for experienced subjects than for inexperienced subjects.
Strong Power vs. Weak Power
The extension of the theory to allow for structural effects coupled with the computer simulations for individual effects permit the following prediction:
H4: Resource differentials will be greater in strong power networks than in weak power networks. The aij parameters are relation effects, i.e., idiosyncratic effects attributable to particular pairs of subjects. The bk parameters are position effects, used to test for positional power in structurally distinct relations. By fixing the intercept at 12 (one-half the resource pool), relation effects and position effects can be interpreted as variations from equality. This model has several important features. First, in exchanges between structurally identical positions, any profit variations are attributable to relation effects. Second, degrees of freedom for testing position effects are reduced considerably over the number used in a simple test of means. Including relation effects absorbs degrees of freedom and also reduces error that would otherwise be associated with the positional power hypotheses. Third, more precise tests for similarities or differences in position effects are possible, e.g., we estimate constrained models and assess the improvement in fit over less constrained models. Such comparisons between models are possible both within and between network configurations. Hypothesis 3. The regression analyses were repeated controlling for subject experience. Results are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2. In the stem network, experienced and inexperienced subjects exploited weak power advantages to significant degrees. Moreover, experienced subjects had an additional outcome advantage of around 1.8 points, as predicted by Hypothesis 3. For the A-B relations, the difference was statistically significant, i.e., the null hypothesis that the position effects are equal for experienced and inexperienced groups was rejected (F[1,180] = 9.098, p = .003). The difference between position effects for the A-C relation in experienced versus inexperienced groups was not significant, however. In the stem network, then, experience has the strongest and most consistent effect in A-B relations.
RESULTS

Analytic
Analyses
Results for the role of experience in the D-E relation in the kite network conform very closely to predictions. Experienced subjects exploited their positional advantage, inexperienced subjects did not. The null hypothesis that the position effects are equal for the two groups was also rejected (F[1, 181] = 9.576, p = .002), indicating that experience translates into significant profit advantages in this structure.12
Only one of the possible profit-enhancing strategies that structurally-advantaged actors in simulated weak power networks could adopt prevailed in our experiments: Experienced subjects in advantaged positions made higher demands, and experienced subjects in disadvantaged positions met these demands. That is, relative to inexperienced subjects, experienced subjects in advantaged positions did not have to discover their advantages and learn to exploit them, and experienced subjects in disadvantaged positions did not have to learn by trial-and-error to avoid exclusion by making more favorable offers. For instance, average offers to B were 9.52 points for inexperienced A's and 6.33 points for experienced A's. The average offer to A from inexperienced B's was 11.74 points, and 14.01 points from experienced B's. Results from an analysis of variance are presented in Table 3 . In the stem network, the position x experience interaction indicates that for experienced subjects relative to inexperienced subjects, B's offers are more extreme in the positive direction and A's are more extreme in the negative direction. For inexperienced subjects in the kite network, D's offered E's 9.31 points on average, and E's offered Table 3 indicate that the dominant effect of experience in the kite network was to raise E's offers. This potent experience-position combination also seems to produce the significant main effects, given that the other three position x experience combinations are relatively close to one another.'3 Hypothesis 4. To examine the relative strength of advantages in strong power networks versus weak power networks, we compared our findings with results from typical strong power experiments (Markovsky et al. 1988 ). The contrast is striking: There is no overlap in the distributions of mean advantages between strong power groups versus weak power groups. The minimum advantage observed for any strong power group was 6.66 points, compared to a maximum advantage of 12 We also estimated a single-equation model that included a dummy variable to capture the effects of experience. This model is more complex because the experimental design forces a collinearity between the dummy variable for experience and the dummy variables for the individual pairs, and interpretation of the parameter estimates depends on which level of experience is chosen as the reference category, i.e., assigned a value of 0. Two specifications are possible. In the kite network, for example, when "inexperienced" is the reference category, structural position has no significant effect, but there is a significant, positive interaction between experience and structural position; when "experienced" is the reference category, structural position has a significant, positive effect while there is a significant, negative interaction between experience and structural position. Both specifications support our conclusion: Inexperienced subjects have no advantage; experienced subjects have an advantage; and the difference is significant. 13 Analyses using experienced subjects in the stem network may provide insights into how experience affects behavior. One group of experienced subjects participated in the kite network in a prior session. The mean exchange outcome for members of this group occupying the A position was 13.86 points. In contrast, the other three groups of experienced subjects had previously interacted in a strong-power structure and, for these subjects, the mean outcome for A in the stem network was 17.00 points. The difference between the two means was statistically significant. This suggests that prior experience affects outcomes via the expectations they foster: Those who expect large profit advantages to 6.60 points in the present experiment. The average advantage in the strong power experiments was approximately 14 points versus approximately 4 points in the present study. Similar contrasts hold with regard to other experiments (Skvoretz and Willer 1991) . In sum, the hypothesis that strong power produces larger profit differentials than does weak power is clearly supported.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
By extending network exchange theory, we identified a new structural basis for positional power in networks. Experimental research on two different network structures tested hypotheses derived from the extended theory. These hypotheses predicted advantages or disadvantages for certain positions in certain relations, the relative magnitudes of strong power effects and weak power effects, and how resource differentials were affected by subjects having experience in other exchange networks. Overall, we found strong support for the extended theory.
The extended theory answers questions raised by Yamagishi and Cook (1990) and Stolte (1990) . Corresponding to Simmel's notion of "formal sociology" (Simmel [1917] 1950, p. 21), and contrary to the usual approach in sociology, these questions were answered using simulations and experiments rather than work in the field. Of what general empirical import, then, is the phenomenon of weak power?
The weak power extension to network exchange theory bridges the relatively simple, sparsely-connected networks in which strong power effects are typically observed and the more complex and densely-connected networks generally found in natural social relations. Such variables are within the original purview of social exchange theory (Homans 1967 (Homans , 1974 Blau 1964 ). Formally constituted structures like monopolistic markets and hierarchies are sparsely-connected -they illustrate strong power differentials. In contrast, informal structures like friendship groups are more densely connected and any power differences tend to be relatively small. The theoretical extension suggests that the heart of strong power lies in the absence of exchange opportunities for the weak and the exchange denials thus created. All else being equal, higher connectivity provides more opportunities for weak positions to "short-circuit" the structural advantages of the strong, and thus a greater likelihood of small resource differentials, i.e., weak power.
In addition to permitting the analysis of denser, more "realistic" networks, our weak power analysis has yielded other dividends. First, network exchange theory moves beyond simply identifying the phenomenon and addresses the more general question of which positions in which networks gain or lose from weak power. Our research has answered that question in theory and corroborated the answer in experiments.
Second, computer simulations revealed that the weak power effect is robust across negotiation strategies, and that some strategies amplify the effect. In fact, for some networks and strategies, the theoretical extremes of weak power should be significantly greater than those predicted and observed in our experiments while remaining below strong power effects. By detecting the weak power effect at or near its weakest, however, we provided a stringent test of the extended theory.
Finally, the extended theory vividly illustrates the mutual dependence of micro-and macroprocesses. Although we have shown that weak power depends on individual decisions and actions, exchange rules, and network structures, much remains to be learned about the complex interactions of these different factors. Our analysis shows that accounting for decisions and behaviors at the levels of individuals and relations can improve our understanding of structural effects, and that only by accounting for structural contingencies can lower level processes and outcomes be fully comprehended. accrue to advantaged positions demand them in the case of structurally advantaged actors, and grant them in the case of the disadvantaged. Supplemental analyses also revealed that actual inclusion rates were closest to GPI3 values for inexperienced subjects. Compared to { (B) = .60 from GPI3, p{B = .66 for inexperienced subjects and .77 for experienced subjects. For the kite network, p (D) = .82 and p (E) = .79. The probabilities for inexperienced subjects were .73 and .82, respectively, and for experienced subjects .59 and .85. In general, GPI3 probability values should be empirically informative to the degree that subjects have no information beyond their own relations, and subjects have more rounds over which to negotiate and adjust offers. In such cases, actual exclusions would serve as a basis for informing counteroffers and partner choices. 
